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Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 9 (Feb. 27, 2014)1 
CONTRACTS/CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Summary 
  
 The Court determined three issues, whether the district court abused its discretion by: (1) 
denying a motion for a new trial due to claims of attorney misconduct; (2) not granting sanctions 
under NCRP 682 and NRS 17.1153; and/or (3) not considering apportioning sanctions.   
 
Disposition 
  
 When a district court sustains an objection to attorney misconduct but fails to admonish 
counsel or the jury, if a party’s counsel does not promptly request the omitted admonishments, 
they are required to demonstrate that opposing counsel’s misconduct was so extreme that its 
effect could not have been removed by the district court’s sustainment of appellants’ objection.   
 When determining whether to award sanctions in a offer of judgment context, the district 
court abuses its discretion by failing to apply the full, applicable legal analysis if it does not 
consider the Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat’l Bank4 factors in its Beattie v. Thomas5 analysis. 
   “[W]hen sanctions are issued against multiple homeowner offerees pursuant to NRS 
17.1156 and NRCP 687 in a construction defect action, a district court abuses its discretion by 
imposing those sanctions jointly and severally against the homeowners.” 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
  
 Appellants/cross-respondents are homeowners in the High Noon at Boulder Ranch 
community.  Appellants hired experts to check their homes for construction defects.  The 
experts’ findings included architectural, insulation, waterproofing, and other defects.  Appellants 
sent D.R. Horton a notice detailing these findings.  In response, D.R. Horton informed the 
appellants of its plan to inspect the alleged defects to decide how to proceed to appellants’ 
notice.  Appellants filed a complaint, suing D.R. Horton for negligence and breach of warranty.   
 D.R. Horton decided to repair the defects after receiving the complaint.  The district court 
agreed to allow D.R. Horton to repair the defects and therefore stayed the proceedings.  D.R. 
Horton gave the appellants a formal statement of repairs after completing the work.  After the 
district court lifted the stay, the appellants filed an amended complaint.  D.R. Horton filed an 
answer to appellants’ complaint as well as a third-party complaint against several subcontractors.   
 Prior to trial, D.R. Horton served offers of judgment on each of the appellants based on 
the extent of each property’s respective damage.  Only one of the forty appellants accepted the 
offer; the rest proceeded to trial.  During closing arguments, counsel for the appellants objected 
to several of defendant D.R. Horton’s and third-party defendant RCR Plumbing’s statements as 
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attorney misconduct.  The district court sustained many of these objections but did not admonish 
counsel or the jury.  The jury awarded damages to each individual homeowner, which totaled 
$66,300.  No individual award exceeded the D.R. Horton’s offer of judgment. 
 Following the trial, the appellants and D.R. Horton filed motions for attorney’s fees and 
costs.  The district court refused to award D.R. Horton attorney’s fees, but did award it post-offer 
costs.  Although the court awarded D.R. Horton post-offer costs, the court denied both motions, 
claiming that under the circumstances it would be impossible to award apportioned fees and 
costs.  Appellants filed a motion for a new trial; in the alternative, appellants asked for additur.  
D.R. Horton filed an opposition to appellants’ motion and filed a counter-motion for remittitur.  
Both motions were denied.           
 
Discussion 
  
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial for attorney misconduct 
 
 The homeowners argued that D.R. Horton’s counsel repeatedly committed misconduct 
throughout the trial, and therefore the district court should gave granted their motion for a new 
trial.  Appellants allege that D.R. Horton’s counsel violated this Court’s decision in Lioce v. 
Cohen8, as well as NRPC 3.4(e)9, by calling the homeowners liars, stating that the trial was a 
waste of the jury’s time, and urging the jury to “send a message” to the homeowners.  Appellants 
also argue that even if the individual statements were insufficient to warrant a new trial, 
cumulatively the statements required the district court to grant appellants’ motion for a new trial.      
 The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.10  “Whether an attorney’s comments are misconduct is a question of law, which we 
review de novo; however, we will give deference to the district court’s factual findings and 
application of the standards to the facts.”11   
 Appellants noted that the district court did not admonish counsel or the jury after D.R. 
Horton’s counsel committed misconduct, even though the court sustained the objection.  The 
Nevada Supreme Court, in addressing this issue for the first time, held:  
 
[W]e now clarify that when a district court sustains an objection to attorney 
misconduct but fails to admonish counsel or the jury, if objecting counsel does not 
promptly request the omitted admonishments, he or she must, in seeking a new 
trial based on the improper conduct, demonstrate that the misconduct was so 
extreme that the objection and sustainment could not have removed the 
misconduct’s effect.12  If the district court fails to admonish counsel or the jury 
after objecting counsel requests such admonishment promptly following his or her 
sustained objection, a party moving for a new trial must only demonstrate that “an 
admonition to the jury would likely have affected the verdict in favor of the 
moving party.”13 
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  Here, because appellants’ counsel did not promptly request the omitted admonishments, 
they were required to demonstrate that D.R. Horton’s counsel’s misconduct was so extreme that 
its effect could not have been removed by the district court’s sustainment of appellants’ 
objection.  The Nevada Supreme Court held that appellants have not met that burden, and 
therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ motion for a new 
trial. 
 Appellants also made an argument that D.R. Horton’s counsel committed misconduct by 
encouraging jury nullification.  The Court looked to Lioce, which found jury nullification where 
“the attorney encouraged the jurors to make their decision based on something other than the law 
and the evidence.”14  The Court found that defense counsel did not prod the jury into rejecting 
the law or the evidence.  The Court found that, although defense counsel used the phrase “send a 
message,” counsel was not inappropriately encouraging jury nullification, and therefore the 
argument did not provide a basis for reversing the district court. 
 Appellants also argued that the cumulative effect of the misconduct justified a new trial.  
To obtain a new trial, the appellant “must demonstrate that no other reasonable explanation for 
the verdict exists.”15  In determining whether this has been shown, the Court will “look at the 
scope, nature, and quantity of misconduct as indicators of the verdict’s reliability.”16  In 
considering appellants’ arguments as a whole, the Court concluded that they failed to meet the 
standard for reversing the district court’s denial of the motion for a new trial.   
 
II. The district court abused its discretion in refusing to issue sanctions pursuant to NRS 
17.11517 and NRCP 6818 and in failing to apportion those sanctions among the homeowners 
 
 The district court found that D.R. Horton’s individual offers of judgment were valid 
pursuant to NRS 17.11519 and NRCP 6820.  Furthermore, the district court found that 39 of the 40 
homeowners rejected the offers, and none of them received a jury award higher than his or her 
offer of judgment.  The district court awarded post-offer costs to D.R. Horton based on these 
findings.  The district court then stated that neither side could allocate or receive any costs or 
attorney fees. 
 Appellants claim that D.R. Horton’s offers of judgment were invalid, preventing D.R. 
Horton from receiving costs pursuant to NRCP 6821 and NRS 17.11522.  On the other hand, 
appellants state that they are entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under NRS 40.65023.  D.R. 
Horton maintains that it is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under NRS 17.11524 and NRCP 
6825, because the offers of judgment were valid, and for the same reason, appellants are 
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precluded from receiving either attorney’s fees or costs after they rejected the offers of judgment.  
Furthermore, D.R. Horton claims that the appellants cannot receive costs because they did not 
file a required memorandum of costs under NRS 18.110(1)26.  Alternatively, D.R. Horton 
contends that it is the prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under NRS 18.02027.  
Appellants argue that D.R. Horton was not the prevailing party and therefore cannot receive 
attorney’s fees and costs under NRS 18.02028. 
  
 A. Sanctions 
 
 The following test is used to determine whether to award attorney’s fees in the offer of 
judgment context:  
 
 (1) [W]hether the plaintiff’s claim was brought in good faith; (2) whether 
the defendant[‘s] offer of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its 
timing and amount; (3) whether the plaintiff’s decision to reject the offer and 
proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith; and (4) whether the fees 
sought by the offeror are reasonable and justified in amount.29 
  
 In considering the fourth factor, a district court must contemplate the Brunzell factors.  
The Brunzell factors include: 
 
 (1) The qualities of the advocate: his ability, his training, education, 
experience, professional standing and skill; (2) the character of the work to be 
done: its difficulty, its intricacy, its importance, time and skill required, the 
responsibility imposed and the prominence and character of the parties where they 
affect the importance of the litigation; (3) the work actually performed by the 
lawyer: the skill time and attention given to the work; (4) the result: whether the 
attorney was successful and what benefits were derived.30 
   
 The Court determined that the district court properly concluded that D.R. Horton’s offers 
of judgment were valid.  Because appellants each failed to obtain an award greater than his or her 
rejected offer of judgment, they are precluded under NRS 17.11531 and NRCP 6832 from 
recovering any costs or attorney’s fees.  Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court’s denial 
of attorney’s fees or costs to appellants. 
 The Court next considered the district court’s order regarding D.R. Horton’s motion for 
attorney’s fees and costs.  The Court noted that the district court was correct in awarding post-
offer costs to D.R. Horton.  However, the Court found that the district court abused its discretion 
by failing to apply the full, applicable legal analysis, because it did not consider the Brunzell 
factors in its Beattie analysis.  On remand, the district court must reconsider its attorney fees 
analysis in regards to D.R. Horton by properly applying both the Beattie and Brunzell factors.  
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Furthermore, the district court is commanded to award D.R. Horton post-offer costs. 
 
B. Apportionment of sanctions issued under NRS 17.11533 and NRCP 6834 
 
 The Court held that “when a district court issues sanctions against multiple offerees 
pursuant to NRS 17.11535 and NRCP 6836, it has and must exercise its discretion to determine 
whether to apportion those sanctions among the multiple offerees or impose those sanctions with 
joint and several liability.”  In determining whether to apportion sanctions or impose sanctions 
with joint and several liability, a district court should consider factors including:  
 
(1) Whether different offerees raise distinct issues justifying segregating the costs 
and attorney fees associated with the litigation; and (2) in the case of a prevailing 
party, whether the party entitled to costs and/or attorney fees would otherwise not 
likely be able to recover a substantial portion of his or her judgment.37 
 
 The Court held that the district court abused its discretion by not making such a 
determination in this case.  The Court further held that “when sanctions are issued against 
multiple homeowner offerees pursuant to NRS 17.11538 and NRCP 6839 in a construction defect 
action, a district court abuses its discretion by imposing those sanctions jointly and severally 
against the homeowners.”  Lastly, the Court held: “[O]n remand, the district court must 
apportion sanctions issued against the homeowners based on their individual offers of 
judgment.” 
 
Conclusion 
  
 The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ motion for a new 
trial.  However, the district did abuse its discretion in refusing to issue sanctions pursuant to NRS 
17.11540 and NRCP 6841 and in failing to apportion those sanctions among the homeowners. 
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